Licensing and anaphora in Tenyidie
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Claim: We present new data from Tenyidie showing that a local object reflexive is the only context that triggers \( \phi \)-covarying agreement on the verb, an apparent violation of the Anaphor Agreement Effect (Rizzi 1990). Since the language lacks genuine agreement, we view this as a side effect of the mechanism for reflexivization, which is Agree mediated by a case licensing head. Thus, the \( \phi \)-features of the object are present on the licensing head (e.g. \( \nu \), \( n \), \( P \)) only when it is a reflexive (with unvalued \( \phi \)-features) by virtue of a feature-sharing dependency (Pesetsky & Torrego 2001, 2007).

Anaphora: Tenyidie, a Sino-Tibetan language, generally lacks both subject and object agreement:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \text{á kéví (*puö)-} \text{tshë bá} \\
& \text{1SG Kevi (*3SG-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘I am praising Kevi.’} \\
& \text{á kéví (*á-)} \text{tshë bá} \\
& \text{1SG Kevi (*1SG-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘I am praising Kevi.’}
\end{align*}
\]

However, when there is a reflexive anaphor in object position the verb shows an obligatory \( \phi \)-covarying agreement on the DP (2). This appears to be the only context exhibiting something like agreement.

\[
\begin{align*}
(2) \quad & \text{ái á-thuö (*á-)tshë bá} \\
& \text{1SG 1SG-SELF (*1SG-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘I am praising myself.’} \\
& \text{puö puö-thuö, (*puö-)tshë bá} \\
& \text{3SG 3SG-SELF (*3SG-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘He is praising himself.’} \\
& \text{nöö, á-thuö (*ń-)tshë bá} \\
& \text{2SG 2SG-SELF (*2SG-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘You are praising yourself.’} \\
& \text{úkô, úkô-thuö, (*úkô-)} \text{tshë bá} \\
& \text{1PL 1PL-SELF (*1PL-)praise cont} \\
& \text{‘We are praising ourselves.’}
\end{align*}
\]

Mediated Agree: We argue that what we find in (1) is not genuine object \( \phi \)-agreement, but instead a by-product of the mechanism for anaphoric binding. A relatively widely-held view is that reflexive pronouns bear an unvalued \((\phi-\text{)}\)-feature that is valued by the antecedent (e.g. Reuland 2001; Heintz 2006; Hicks 2009; Vanden Wyngaard & Rooryck 2011). Heintz (2006) argues that this Agree relation is mediated by \( \nu \). As shown in (3), when \( \nu \) agrees with the direct object to Case-license it, the unvalued \( \phi \)-feature on the reflexive creates a feature-sharing dependency between \( \nu \) and DO with regard to this feature (Pesetsky & Torrego 2001, 2007). This means that the feature is now also present on \( \nu \). When \( \nu \) introduces the external argument, i.e. the antecedent, it values the \( \phi \)-probe on \( \nu \) and, by virtue of feature-sharing, the reflexive. Assuming V-to-\( \nu \) movement, the features on \( \nu \) can be realized as what looks like object agreement. However, the language generally lacks object agreement, and therefore genuine \( \phi \)-probes on \( \nu \). The only context in which \( \phi \)-features can be transferred to \( \nu \), and subsequently spelled out there, is when \( \nu \) facilitates reflexive binding.

Licensing: Since Agree is mediated by the case licensing head \( \nu \), we expect to find this in other domains for example, DP-internal anaphors trigger agreement on the noun. We assume that this the realization of the licensing head \( n \). This head case-licenses the internal argument and also introduces the antecedent, either a silent PRO (4a) or an overt possessor (4b). Abstractly, this has the same local feature-sharing configuration as in (3), with \( n \) instead of \( \nu \). A further example
involves ECM constructions. These involve a familiar indirect causative with the verb let, which we assume case licenses the the ECM subject via v (5a). If v licenses a reflexive, the verb shows agreement (5b). This is because v mediates feature transfer between the ECM anaphor and PRO.

(5) a. ái TP PRO [V [TP ñi VP] v[case] +búnũ] [VP dzũ krié] ] nyũ bã
   1SG.SBJ 2SG.OBJ  let water drink want PRO
   ‘I want you to drink water.’

b. ái TP PRO [V [TP á-thuóí VP] *(á-)búnũ] [VP dzũ krié] ] nyũ bã
   1SG.SBJ 15G-SELF *(1SG-)let water drink want PRO
   ‘I want myself to drink water.’

Ditransitives: Further evidence for the role of case licensing comes from ditransitives. (6a) shows that the neutral order is DO > IO. The IO can be replaced with a reflexive pronoun and triggers φ-marking on the verb (6b). Interestingly, however, the the direct object cannot be replaced with a reflexive in this configuration (6c). The grammatical variant involves leftward scrambling of the IO (6d), which results in ki-marking that we treat as differential-object marking (López 2012).

(6) a. á letter-u kěvi pekie fó
   1SG letter-def Kevi show perf
   ‘I showed the letter to Kevi.’

b. ái letter-u á-thuóí á-pekie fó
   1SG letter-def 15G-SELF 15G-show perf
   ‘I showed the letter to myself.’

c. *ái á-thuóí kěvi (á-)pekie fó
   1SG-SELF Kevi 15G-show perf
   ‘I showed myself to Kevi.’

d. ái kěvi-ki á-thuóí á-pekie fó
   1SG Kevi-ki 15G-SELF 15G-show perf
   ‘I showed myself to Kevi.’

This follows if the features on a reflexive must be valued via v. Assuming that the IO is normally Case-licensed by v and the DO by Appl (e.g. McGinnis 1998), then feature-sharing between the IO and v is established and the features transferred to the anaphor. The left tree in (7) shows (6b). However, since v does not agree with the DO, it cannot transfer the φ-values of the EA to the reflexive and the derivation crashes due to its unvalued φ-feature. The alternative strategy is to have v Case-license the DO (the Case probe on Appl is optional). In order to facilitate this, the IO must be licensed otherwise. This is achieved by the K(ase)P shell resulting from short scrambling (i.e. DOM; see Rodríguez-Mondoñedo 2007; Richards 2010; Baker 2014). Now that the IO no longer intervenes, v licenses the DO and, crucially, creates the feature-sharing dependency necessary for transferring the φ-values to the reflexive. The mediated Agree analysis accounts for why the IO must move if the DO is a reflexive, since it receives its φ-values as a side-effect of licensing by v.

(7)

This is illustrated in the right tree in (7). The top φ-node in the left tree is realized by the top φ-node in the right tree.

Conclusion: Tenyidie shows a close link between licensing and agreement with anaphors. Case-licensing heads mediate feature transfer to the anaphor, thereby supporting Agree-based theories of reflexivization. Since this is not real agreement, Tenyidie does not counterexemplify Rizzi’s AAE.